[WSF-Discuss] Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) Briefing Paper - Biometric ‘Aadhaar’, a Made in USA product; and Jean Drèze - The Aadhaar coup

gopal krishna 1715krishna at gmail.com
Mon Apr 4 00:18:38 CDT 2016

Gopal Krishna
ToxicsWatch Allian

*Statement from Dr M.Vijayanunni, ex-Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala
& Registrar General of India & Census Commissioner on Biometric Aadhaar
Number *

British prime minister Cameron came to office at the last general elections
on the back of his promise to undo the ID number system introduced by the
then government and he promptly kept his election promise by dismantling
the ID machinery already in place. He further ensured the deletion of all
the stored data on citizens in the national data storage so that no future
government will be able to use or misuse it to spy on the citizens for any
purpose. He won universal praise and a place in history by this historic

China, which is the other country in the world comparable to India in terms
of size and diversity of population, abandoned its universal ID system
midway in the face of insurmountable problems encountered during its
implementation, despite the supposed advantage of their totalitarian system
in pushing through such a humongous but ill-advised project.

While the USA has the social security number for all residents, it does not
intrude into the privacy of the individuals and is so liberally implemented
that it does not block or stand in the way of getting any deserved benefits
from the state or from availing of any services from other agencies.

As usual in other state matters, India's immediate neighbours, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Nepal might be sucked into the vortex of the precedent set
by India and end up in the same inextricable difficulties in the
implementation of the universal ID. This has been their experience in other
ventures in copying India like in the never-ending constitution-framing
experience in Nepal, the secular declaration in theocratic Bangladesh, the
Hindu civil law in Pakistan etc.

The government's attraction to the project is the supposed reduction
achieved in disbursal of subsidies through avoidance of duplicate and bogus
claims. This has to be achieved through other administrative modalities in
each individual scheme rather than by steamrolling it through an uncaring
denial of thousands of claims based merely on faults in the biometric and
data retrieval systems.

The real pressure for continuance of the scheme will be from the police and
secret surveillance systems to pry into the privacy of everyone which gives
them unlimited powers over the lives of helpless individuals and enjoy
unchallenged supremacy in the days to come. That will sound the death-knell
of freedom and democracy.

There have been umpteen complaints from the affected citizens in the actual
collection and collation of the biometric and personal data in the field so
far and the project is engulfed in the tears and curses of lakhs of people
of all social strata up against the uncaring ways of the officials doing
the aadhaar exercise. It is pulling wool over one's eyes if it were to be
claimed that it has been perfectly implemented so far.

Ph: 04712340041, E-mail: mvijayanunni at gmail.com


Gopal Krishna, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL), Mb: 09818089660,
08227816731, E-mail-1715krishna at gmail.com

"The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to
escape finding
oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations

"We may admire what he does, but we despise what he is."-referring to
humans who act mechanically on instructions
-------Wilhelm von Humboldt, 1792

On Sun, Apr 3, 2016 at 1:18 AM, Jai Sen <jai.sen at cacim.net> wrote:

> Saturday, April 2, 2016
> *Freedoms in movement…*
> [I am posting here two recent articles that have appeared in India
> critically reviewing the so-called ‘Aadhaar’ project, an unprecedentedly
> huge operation whose often-professed objective is to ‘make life easier for
> ordinary people and for government’, but the underlying thrust of which –
> as has also been pointed out in various articles I have earlier posted – is
> perhaps the biggest and most comprehensive operation of state (and
> corporate) intrusion and mass surveillance that has ever taken place
> anywhere; comparable only, because of the number of people involved – the
> entire population of India, 1 point something billion – to that run by
> Google.
> [I am doing so here, on this list, because there are surely other states
> that are watching, and learning from, India, and so these critiques, though
> located within the Indian context, are therefore relevant to everyone
> concerned about justice and freedoms, everywhere :
> *Biometric ‘Aadhaar’, a Made in USA product : Wikileaks papers reveal that
> Biometric Aadhaar/NPR promotes US interests*
> Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL)
> *The Aadhaar coup*
> Jean Drèze
>             With profound thanks to the authors, and in solidarity,
>             JS
> fwd
> Begin forwarded message:
> *From: *"Gopal Krishna" <krishnagreen at gmail.com>
> *Subject: **[pmarc] Briefing Paper:Biometric ‘Aadhaar’, a Made in USA
> product*
> *Date: *April 2, 2016 at 4:49:30 AM EDT
> *To: *"Dalits Media Watch" <PMARC at dgroups.org>
> *Reply-To: *"Dalits Media Watch" <PMARC at dgroups.org>
> *Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL)*
> *April, 2016*
> *Briefing Paper *
> *Biometric ‘Aadhaar’, a Made in USA product *
> *Wikileaks papers reveal Biometric Aadhaar/*(*NPR** promotes US interests*
> *(MS Word version of the Briefing Paper is is attached)*
> “Aaadhaar was launched on September 29, 2010….This is the fastest digital
> platform to reach a billion, the only non-US one and the only one by a
> government[1] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn1>,”
> claims Nandan Nilekani, former Chairman, Unique Identification Authority of
> India (UIDAI). The claim of biometric unique identity (UID)/ Aadhaar number
> being a non-US digital platform isn’t factually correct.
> The documents accessed through RTI reply dated 25th October, 2013 reveal
> that this is an impudent misrepresentation of facts. In the contract
> agreement between the President of India for UIDAI, as purchaser and L-1
> Identity Solutions Operating Company, and Accenture Services Pvt Ltd
> accessed through RTI at clause 15.1 it is stated, "*By virtue of this
> Contract, M/s Accenture Services Pvt Ltd/Team of M/s Accenture Services Pvt
> Ltd may have access to personal information of the Purchaser and/or a third
> party or any resident of India, any other person covered within the ambit
> of any legislation as may be applicable*." The purchaser is President of
> India through UIDAI. The clause 15.3 of the agreements reads, "The Data
> shall be retained by Accenture Services Pvt Ltd not more than a period of 7
> years as per Retention Policy of Government of India or any other policy
> that UIDAI may adopt in future." Copies of the contract agreement are
> available with the author. This clearly implies that all the biometric data
> of Indians which has been collected so far is now available to US
> Government and French Government because of Patriot Act and French
> government’s stake in the company in question.
> The disclosures by *Wikileaks* about the keen interest of US
> administration in the Aadhaar project underlies that it is interested in
> knowing about biometric database of the world's largest democracy.[2]
> <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn2> General Keith
> Alexander, as director of USA’s National Security Agency (NSA) had
> instructed information gathering saying, "sniff it all, know it all,
> collect it all, process it all and exploit it all”.[3]
> <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn3> The aadhaar and
> related schemes are unfolding in this backdrop.
> When asked “whether or not you think by the year 2050 there could be a
> global system … (which) would be a real influence on knocking down the
> nation state, which I think needs knocking down.” Nilekani admitted, “There
> is nothing technologically limiting in having the whole population of the
> world on the system.” This poses a grave threat to sovereignty of the
> citizens and the country. He and his project appear quite complicit in
> unconstitutional act of surrendering the country’s interest in favour of a
> global system led by ungovernable and undemocratic business enterprises not
> by democratic legislatures.
> It is not known whether Nilekani took oath of office for a Cabinet
> Minister of the Union of India given the fact that he was chairman of UIDAI
> in the rank of a cabinet minister and was responsible for the creation of
> world’s most sensitive database using personal sensitive information of
> Indian residents with the help of transnational corporations from USA and
> other countries.
> Given the sensitivity of the assignment and given his rank of cabinet
> minister as per the Constitution of India, he should have been made to take
> oath saying:  "I, Nandan Nilekani, do swear in the name of God/solemnly
> affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of
> India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and
> integrity of India,] that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge
> my duties as a Minister for the Union and that I will do right to all
> manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law, without
> fear or favour, affection or ill-will."
> The contract documents revealed through RTI underline that in the absence
> of such an oath subversion of the Constitution has happen whose
> implications have been ascertained by the Parliamentary Standing Committee
> on Finance and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology.
> It has not been revealed till date whether Nilekani enrolled for biometric
> unique identification (UID)/aadhaar number.
> As per the Constitution of India, Nilekani should have taken oath saying:
> "I, Nandan Nilekani, do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I
> will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person or
> persons any matter which shall be brought under my consideration or shall
> become known to me as a Minister for the Union except as may be required
> for the due discharge of my duties as such Minister."
> It merits exploration as to how likes of Nilekani will be penalized if
> they formally hands over the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of
> UID/ aadhaar numbers to foreign governments and companies. What will happen
> to him and his successors now that it is clear that in the name of awarding
> contracts to biometric technology companies from US and other countries
> have been handed over biometric and demographic details of Indian
> residents? It is noteworthy that his counterpart in Pakistan gave away the
> entire record of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)
> to USA as has been revealed by the diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks.
> This was disclosed on 19th June, 2012.
> Speaking on “Technology to Leapfrog Development: The Aadhaar Experience”
> at Center for Global Development, Washington, Nandan Nilekani admitted,
> “Now, biometrics has a big history in the world. Biometrics was first used
> in India in the 1870s when the British used it for land titling, and they
> also used people's fingerprints to record the registration of documents.
> Historically, and up until a few years ago, the use of biometrics was
> essentially in forensics. It was about using biometrics for crime
> investigation and crime protection….So, fundamentally, biometrics was used
> for forensic purposes. But, after 9/11, biometrics has increasingly been
> used for the purpose of surveillance, or security, or for immigration
> control.” He was delivering the Eighth Annual Richard H. Sabot Lecture on 22
> nd April 22, 2013 as Chairman, UIDAI. It is evident that Parliament,
> State legislatures and citizens besides the Supreme Court has been kept in
> dark about the ulterior motive of the collection of biometric data by
> foreign companies from USA and other countries.
> After Statement of Concern by 17 eminent citizens like Justice V R Krishna
> Iyer , adverse report of the multi party Parliamentary Standing Committee
> on Finance, the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana Court, the order of
> National Human Rights Commission to the Union Home Secretary Affairs, the
> admission  of a complaint regarding illegal, illegitimate and
> unconstitutional subordinate legislation for biometric Aadhhar/UID by
> Parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation, in a series of
> statements on Twitter, Narendra Modi, the Prime Ministerial candidate of
> BJP and Gujarat Chief Minister has asked the Indian National Congress led
> Government, “Were all states on board on Aadhaar?” in the aftermath of the
> Supreme Court ‘s order of September 23, 2013 rebuking the Government for
> making it mandatory. Have these concerns become irrelevant for the present
> Prime Minister?
> Modi had said, “When the SC raised these points, the PM must tell nation
> that did all states and departments approve Aadhar? But you just spent huge
> money. You need to answer nation for that. What the Supreme Court said
> today, I raised the similar point three years ago. I told him to convene a
> National Security Card meeting, consult Chief Ministers, but he did
> nothing. Nation wants to know from the PM how much money was spent on
> Aadhar card? Who gained from it? What about the questions the SC raised?”.
> It is noteworthy t hat even as he raised these questions Gujarat Government
> continued to act as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), it signed
> with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for the
> implementation of aadhaar project. The MoU was signed by V. N. Maira. IAS.
> Principal Secretary (Planning), General Administration Department, Gujarat
> Government on 9th June 9, 2010.
> State Governments, especially the ones ruled by opposition parties ought
> to withdraw from the MoUs they have signed with UIDAI. So far they have
> failed to apply their legal minds to it the way they did in the case of
> National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). They have failed to appreciate
> that UID, NPR, NCTC and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is linked and
> is being linked with Census and Voters’ database.
> Unmindful of threat to federalism most States including Bihar, Odisha,
> Tripura, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal  have signed a MoU with UIDAI.
> Surprisingly, the States which were quite vocal about threats to federal
> structure from Union Home Ministry‘s National Counter Terrorism Centre
> (NCTC) and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) that integrates 21 sets of
> databases have been caught unawares by the creation of UID’s Centralized
> Identities Data Register (CIDR) disregarding the fact that CIDR is going to
> be converged. State Governments have chosen to listen to consultants who
> are more interested in making a quick sale of their biometric,
> identification and surveillance technology products.
> In 1906, another Gujarati, Mahatma Gandhi had encountered a similar
> Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance proposed by the Transvaal Government in the
> August 22 issue of the Government Gazette required all Indians in the
> Transvaal region of South Africa, eight years and older, to report to the
> Registrar of Asiatics and obtain, upon the submission of a complete set of
> fingerprints, a certificate which would then have to be produced upon
> demand. Fingerprints were then demanded only from criminals, and the
> subjection of women to such a requirement had no other objective but the
> humiliation of Indians. Gandhi understood well that the Ordinance
> effectively criminalized the entire community and must be challenged. At a
> meeting held in Johannesburg, 3000 Indians took an oath not to submit to a
> degrading and discriminatory piece of legislation. This gave birth to
> Satyagraha. Gandhi later wrote that the ordinance illustrated hatred
> towards Indians which, if passed, “would spell absolute ruin for the
> Indians in South Africa.”
> The opposition parties must ponder over: How is CIDR of Aadhaar and NPR
> which also generates Aadhaar 'number different from the ‘register of
> Asiatics’ opposed by Mahatma Gandhi? If Indians forget the lesson of this
> resistance movement it would “spell absolute ruin for the Indians” of the
> present and future generations.
> A historic eight-year-long resistance campaign against biometric
> identification happened from August 1906 to January 1914 in the British
> colony of Natal, and Boer Republic of Transvaal, South Africa. In August
> 1906, the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance was signed into law in the
> Transvaal. It was a humiliating and discriminating law forcing Indians in
> the Transvaal to register with the ‘registrar of Asiatics,’ submit to
> physical examinations, provide fingerprints, and carry a registration
> certificate at all times. Otherwise, Indians and other ‘Asiatics,’ as they
> were called, could be fined, imprisoned, or deported. A delegation of
> Indians sailed to London to meet with British Secretary of State Lord
> Elgin. In 1912, Gopal Krishna Gokhale visited South Africa and expressed
> his support for the struggle against biometric idnetification. In early
> 1914, an agreement was reached with the protestors and the Black Act
> seeking biometric identification was abolished.
> Historians rightly say that all history is contemporary history. It was
> reported on October 6, 20111 that Gujarat Chief Minister wrote to the Prime
> Minister questioning the need for biometric data collection for National
> Population Register (NPR) by Registrar General of India & Census
> Commissioner, Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Gujarat stopped collection of
> biometric data for creation of the NPR. In his letter to the then Prime
> Minister, Modi raised objections over both the Unique Identification
> Authority of India (UIDAI), which is creating Unique Identification
> (UID)/Aadhaar Number and Registrar General of India, which is creating the
> NPR, collecting biometric data. In his letter to the then Prime Minister,
> Modi wrote, “there is no mention of capturing biometrics in the Citizenship
> Act or Citizenship Rules 2009”. He added, “In the absence of any provision
> in the Citizenship Act, 1955, or rules for capturing biometrics, it is
> difficult to appreciate how the capture of biometrics is a statutory
> requirement. Photography and biometrics is only mentioned in the Manual of
> Instructions for filling up the NPR household schedule and even in that
> there is no mention of capturing the Iris”. After Gujarat stopped
> collection of biometric data, the then Union Minister of Home Affairs sent
> a letter to Modi in August 2011 pointing out that creation of the NPR was a
> “statutory requirement” under the Citizenship Act, 1955, and “once
> initialized, has to be necessarily completed”. The Union Minister of Home
> Affairs had also requested the CM to instruct state government officers to
> cooperate in creation of the NPR. This was when the entire media, the
> citizens and the political class was hoodwinked into believing that there
> was a rift between UIDAI and  Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
> But Modi chose to side with UIDAI in an apparent rebuff to MHA. Modi
> kicked off UID/Adhaar project in Gujarat on 1stMay, 2012 by giving his
> biometric information for his aadhaar/UID number and enrolled under the
> UIDAI project. Strangely, Modi did not object to his biometric
> identification under UID as he did with regard to NPR. Modi did so despite
> the fact that Yashwant Sinha headed Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC)
> on Finance rejected the UID project and the UID Bill in its report to the
> Parliament on December 13, 2011. However, it may be noted that one sentence
> of the PSC report appears to endorse biometric NPR. Was it a case of Sinha
> trying to side with Chidambaram and Modi trying to side with Nilekani? It
> appears that Modi has been taken for ride with regard to the UID/Aadhaar
> and Sinha with regard to NPR as they failed to see through the ‘approved
> strategy’. Now it is clear that the staged rift that was created between
> Home Ministry and Planning Commission’ UIDAI on UID and NPR was motivated
> and was meant to take legislatures, citizens, States and media for a ride.
> Both Modi and Sinha got misled because Chidambram left the Home Ministry
> and became the Finance Minister. Notably, the UIDAI was the proposed by the
> Ministry of Finance in 2009. Thus, both were outwitted by Chidambaram.
> Modi’s letter to the Prime Minister objecting to the biometric data
> collection sought by Chidamabram was made irrelevant. Modi’s biometric data
> is now the property of UIDAI and because UIDAI and NPR data is to be
> collated ‘as per approved strategy’ it is also the property of Registrar
> General of India’s NPR to which he had objected.
> The Terms of Reference No. 8 of Planning Commission’s notification dated
> January 28, 2009 that created Unique Identification Authority of India
> (UIDAI) in pursuance of the 4th meeting of the Empowered Group of
> Ministers, states, “Take necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR and UID
> (as per approved strategy)”.
> A Prime Minister’s Office which has been promoting biometric data
> collection purportedly to make delivery of social welfare programs leak
> proof itself isn’t leak proof. Given a choice between leakage or theft of
> citizens database of sensitive personal information and leakage of public
> distribution system and delivery social welfare services what would be be
> chosen and which can be plugged more easily.
> It must be recalled that database of Greece has been stolen as per Reuters
> and the database of Pakistan and Egypt has been handed over to US as per
> the diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks.
> In UID/Aadhaar Enrolment Form, Column 9 reads: "I have no objection to the
> UIDAI sharing information provided by me to the UIDAI with agencies engaged
> in delivery of welfare services". In front of this column, there is a "Yes"
> and "No" option. Irrespective of what option
> residents of India exercise (which is being ticked automatically by the
> enroler in any case as of now), the fact is this information being
> collected for creating Centralized Identity Data Register (CIDR) and NPR
> (column 7) will be handed over to biometric technology companies.
> At a lecture on 23rd November, 2012, Nilekani ominously stated that if
> you do not have the Aadhaar you will not get the right to rights. UID is
> like a financial address for the people. The question is if Aadhaar is only
> an identifier of residents of India how does it accord to itself an
> inherent right to approve or disapprove rights of citizens to have rights? *Karnataka
> based groups have informed that the name Aadhaar is linked to the NGO of
> Nilekani that worked in the matter of Bangalore Agenda Task Force from 1999
> to 2004.*
> Overwhelmed by the marketing blitzkrieg of biometric technology vendors
> from USA and other countries, public institutions in India are yet to pay
> heed to the sane decisions of Governments of USA, Australia, China, UK,
> France and Germany who have decided against indiscriminate biometric
> identification.
> “UID will create a digital caste system because going by the way it is
> now being implemented, if you choose not to be part of the system, you will
> be the modern-day equivalent of an outcast. In theory, you are supposed to
> have the freedom to choose but in reality, the choice will only be whether
> to be left out and left behind[4]
> <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn4>,” warned Jacob
> Appelbaum, computer security researcher, hacker, activist, and a
> spokesperson for *WikiLeaks*. Nilekani and his ilk are promoting digital
> caste system.
> While presenting the Union Budget 2009-10, the then finance minister,
> Pranab Mukherjee announced the setting up of the UIDA to “establish an
> online database with identity and biometric details of Indian residence and
> provide enrolment and verification services across the country” in
> paragraph no. 64 of his speech allocating 120 crore to it. Coincidentally,
> immediately after this announcement, he underlined the need for “the
> modernisation of police force in the states” in paragraph 65 of the speech
> that dealt with “national security”. In this speech of 6th July, 2009,
> the finance minister informed Parliament about the arrival of Nilekani
> without naming him saying, “This project is very close to my heart. I am
> happy to note that this project also marks the beginning of an era where
> the top private sector talent in India steps forward to take the
> responsibility for implementing projects of vital national importance.”[5]
> <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn5>
> This was before the UID Bill (The National Identification Authority of
> India Bill, 2010) was introduced in the Parliament and rejected by the
> parliamentary standing committee on finance in its report to Parliament in
> December 13, 2011 raising serious national security concerns.
> Nilekani joined UIDAI not in person but in his role as co-chairman of the
> board of directors of Infosys Technologies Limited, which he co-founded in
> 1981 and served as director on the company's board since its inception to
> July 2, 2009. This appears manifestly incestuous. It was the chairman,
> Infosys Ltd, an artificial person who was asked to head UIDAI, and a not a
> natural citizen.
> The transnational companies like Ernst & Young. L1 Identities Solution,
> Safran and Accenture are involved in this exercise. Ironically, these
> companies are taking the personal sensitive information for “seven years”
> and Government is paying for it.
> Legislators and policy makers in particular and the political class in
> general must examine as to why bankers are immensely interested in
> biometric identification and verification of citizens.  Biometric
> identification implies that movements of present and future generations of
> citizens are tracked like those of bacteria under a microscope.
> What is ironical is that while it is inevitable that no centralized
> electronic database of biometric information can be made leak proof in the
> post Wikileaks and Edward Snowden world, the bankers, biometric technology
> companies and their collaborators are marketing it as an answer to
> increasing demand for identity proof and identity protection from citizens.
> In 1998, National Biometric Test Center, San Jose State University set up
> by the Biometric Consortium, which is the U.S. government interest group on
> biometric authentication was asked to testify to the USA’s House Committee
> on Banking and Financial Services hearing on “Biometrics and the Future of
> Money”. This testimony of May 20, 1998 was reprinted under the title,
> “Biometric Identification and the Financial Services Industry. This centre
> emerged from a meeting of Biometric Consortium held in 1995 at the FBI
> training facility. This Test Centre has defined biometric authentication as
> “the automatic identification or identity verification of an individual
> based on physiological and behavioral characteristics”.
> Whatever is happening in India is an exercise in imitation of what was
> attempted in USA through the REAL ID Act of 2005 amidst bitter opposition.
> The US Senate never discussed or voted on the REAL ID Act specifically and
> no Senate committee hearings were conducted on the Real ID Act prior to its
> passage exposing its undemocratic character and the bill's proponents
> avoided a substantive debate on a far-reaching piece of legislation by
> attaching it to a "must-pass" bill. Barack Obama categorically opposed it
> during the 2008 presidential election campaign. As of 2008, all 50 states
> have either applied for extensions of the original May 11, 2008 compliance
> deadline or received unsolicited extensions.
> As of October 2009, 25 states have approved either resolutions or binding
> legislation not to participate in the program.  Among other concerns they
> have argued that it infringes upon states’ rights.With Janet Napolitano,
> a prominent critic of the program as the head of USA’sDepartment of
> Homeland Security, the future of the law appears sealed. On March 5, 2011,
> the USA’s Department of Homeland Security postponed the effective date of
> the Real ID Act. Through a Document Number FR 5-08 Department of Homeland
> Security announced that US states would need to be in compliance with the
> REAL ID Act by December 1, 2017. Bills have been introduced into US
> Congress to amend or repeal it. The controversial, $4 billion Real ID
> initiative was meant to provide secure licenses in the hands of 245 million
> Americans by 2017. The new proposal,Providing for Additional Security in
> States’ Identification (PASS ID) Act is expected to eliminate many of the
> more burdensome technological requirements.  The BILL is meant to repeal
> title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and amend title II of the Homeland
> Security Act of 2002 to better protect the security, confidentiality, and
> integrity of personally identifiable information collected by States when
> issuing driver’s licenses and identification documents, and for other
> purposes. It is surprising as to why Government of India which has been
> keen on emulating REAL ID Act when it was adopted in USA has developed cold
> feet in following the same example when it is practically abandoned
> there.
> In India, when one looks at the definition of the “Biometrics” which
> “means the technologies that measure and analyse human body
> characteristics, such as ‘fingerprints’, ‘eye retinas and irises’, ‘voice
> patterns’, “facial patterns’, ‘hand measurements’ and ‘DNA’ for
> authentication purposes” as per Information Technology (Reasonable security
> practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules,
> 2011 under section 87 read with section 43A of Information Technology Act,
> 2000, it becomes clear that the plan of data collection does not end with
> collection of finger prints and iris scan it goes quite beyond it.
> The fact remains biometric data like finger print, voice print, iris scan
> and DNA do not reveal citizenship. While use of biometric technology, an
> advanced technique for the identification of humans, based on their
> characteristics or traits is unfolding there is agency within India to.
> These traits can be face, fingerprint, iris, voice, signature, palm, vein,
> and DNA. DNA recognition and vein recognition are the latest and most
> advanced types of biometric authentication. Biometric technology is being
> deployed in the application areas like government, travel and immigration,
> banking and finance, and defense. Government applications cover voting,
> personal ID, license, building access, etc.; whereas travel and immigration
> use biometric authentication for border access control, immigration,
> detection of explosives at the airports, etc. Banking and finance sector
> use biometric authentication for account access, ATM security, etc.
> The International Biometric Industry Association has listed potential
> applications for including voter registration, access to healthcare
> records, banking transactions, national identification systems and parental
> control. Indeed “Biometrics are turning the human body into the universal
> ID card of the future”. Unmindful of dangerous ramifications of such
> applications, if citizens and political parties concerned about civil
> liberties do not act quickly enough biometric ID’s are all set to be made
> as common as email addresses without any legal and legitimate mandate.
> Biometric information includes DNA profiling wherein biological traits are
> taken from a person because by their very nature are unique to the
> individual and positively identifies that person within an ever larger
> population as the technology improves.
> In its April 13, 2013 report titled ‘Regional Economic Outlook, Asia and
> Pacific Shifting Risks, New Foundations for Growth’ as part of World
> Economic and Financial Surveys, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes
> that “India is planning to enhance its existing cash transfer program and
> identification system in connection with the ongoing subsidy reform”.
> Elaborating it further it reports how “India has also been rapidly
> expanding its biometric Uniform Identification system (aadhaar), which will
> establish an accurate and paperless means of identifying all Indians by
> 2014. This program will also present large opportunities for savings. A
> nationally uniform, biometric database would cut down on leakages from
> outdated biographical information, ghost identification, double
> registration, and other losses, which have been estimated in the range of
> 15–20 percent of total spending.”
> Underlining the convergence underway, it says, “The integration of these
> two programs, aadhaar and direct cash transfers, promises further savings
> but will involve many challenges: the timeframe for bringing India’s
> population of 1.2 billion into the aadhar program could extend beyond 2014,
> and integrating this database with information on individuals eligible for
> subsidized fuel will take time. Shifting the fertilizer subsidy from
> companies to individual farmers and building up the capacity to deliver
> payments electronically could also be challenging in such a large country.
> But the total savings could be substantial: if the combination of direct
> cash transfer and aadhaar eliminates the estimated 15 percent leakage cited
> above for the programs being integrated, savings could total ½ percent of
> GDP in addition to the gains from the better targeting of spending on the
> poor.”
> Such claims are figments of IMF’s imagination unless the total estimated
> budget of the UID/Aadhaar project is disclosed. It is irrational for anyone
> to reach inference about benefits from any project without factoring in the
> costs but World Bank Group is doing it and endorsing similar acts by
> Not surprisingly, having applauded both biometric identification and cash
> transfer, the World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim underlined the
> importance of the subject to the World Bank Group in his opening remarks at
> the Bank's Development Economics Lecture series on April 24, 2013 in
> Washington where Chairman, Planning Commission’s Unique Identification
> Authority of India (UIDAI) and Chairman, Infosys Technologies, Nandan
> Manohar Nilekani spoke about the unique system for the biometric
> identification of Indian residents. It may be recalled that Robert B.
> Zoellick, the then World Bank Chief met Chairman of the UIDAI on December
> 4, 2009. What transpired at these meetings is not in public domain.
> In the aftermath of these meetings what is least talked about is that the
> E-identity and UID/aadhaar related projects are part of World Bank’s
> eTransform Initiative formally launched on April 23, 2010 for converging
> private sector, citizen sector and public sector and Interpol’s e-identity
> database project. This along with the then Union Finance Minister, Pranab
> Mukherjee’s announcement in January 2011 voluntarily seeking full-fledged
> Financial Sector Assessment Programmee by IMF and the World Bank merits
> attention of the legislatures and concerned citizens.
> In April, 2010 L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (which has now been purchased
> by biometric technology company Safran group, a French corporation signed a
> Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between L-1 and the World Bank was signed
> as part of the launch of the initiative at a World Bank Spring Meeting
> event attended by many developing country Ministers of Finance and
> Communications. It claimed that this collaborative relationship with the
> World Bank is meant to improve the way governments in developing countries
> deliver services to citizens as part of the launch of the World Bank
> eTransform Initiative (ETI).
> The World Bank's ETI seeks to leverage Information and Communication
> Technology (ICT) to build a knowledge sharing network that helps
> governments of developing nations to leverage the best practices of
> practitioners like L-1 and others to improve the delivery of social and
> economic services. The knowledge sharing network will focus on areas such
> as electronic Identification (eID), e-Procurement, e-Health and
> e-Education; areas vital to promoting the participation of citizens in
> democratic processes, such as voting, and helping undocumented citizens get
> access to health and welfare programs. The World Bank is currently funding
> 14 projects related to e-government and e-ID around the world. Are citizens
> supposed to believe that the World Bank Group is working to ensure that
> India's national interest and its citizens’ rights are protected?
> "The speed and precision with which developing countries administer
> services is dependent upon many factors, not the least of which is the
> ability to verify the identities of those receiving services," said Mohsen
> Khalil, Director of the World Bank's Global Information and Communication
> Technologies Department in a statement.
> Robert V. LaPenta, Chairman, President and CEO of L-1 Identity Solutions
> had said, "We believe that identity management solutions and services can
> make a significant contribution to society and undocumented citizens in
> developing countries, bringing them out of anonymity and helping establish
> their place and participation in society and affirming their rights to
> benefits they are entitled to receive as citizens."
> It has been underlined that the “game-changing UID applications in
> payments, savings, and other tools for driving efficiency and transparency”
> using “already created one of the world's largest platforms (that
> is)  transforming not only authentication but also everything from
> government payments to financial inclusion”. In effect, it is a case
> biometric profiling by the IFIs who have vested interest in surveillance of
> financial transactions.
> In his book Imagining India, Nilekani refers to Bank’s economist, Hernando
> de Soto's book 'The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West
> and Fails Everywhere Else' to argue that national ID system would be a big
> step for land markets to facilitate right to property and undoing of
> abolition of right to property in 1978 in order to bring down poverty! In
> the post capitalist and post socialist era, such assumptions of triumph
> have been found to be deeply flawed.  In fact even the title of the books
> sounds weird in the post financial crisis era.
> In the Parliament, on April 23, 2013, Abdul Rahman, MP asked the Union
> Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) about the percentage of the population
> covered under UID (Aadhaar), National Population Register (NPR) and Voters
> Identity Card, so far and the areas where information provided in these UID
> (Aadhaar), NPR and Voters Identity Card overlap; and the steps taken to
> avoid overlapping of the information contained therein.  The reply was
> given but what it did not disclose is that the overlapping is deliberate
> because the real motive of the entire exercise is to ensure convergence of
> all pre-existing databases and the databases under creation as envisaged by
> the IFIs.
> Press Information Bureau (PIB), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
> India issued a release dated 22nd July, 2015 titled "Linking of NPR data
> with Aadhar Numbers" It reads: "The Government has decided to update the
> National Population Register (NPR) and seed the Aadhaar number in NPR
> database at an estimated cost of Rs. 951.35 crore. The field work would be
> completed by March 2016. This updated NPR database along with Aadhaar
> Number would become the *mother database *and can be used by various
> government departments for selection of beneficiaries under their
> respective schemes. There is no duplication of efforts as all the agencies
> namely Registrar General of Citizen Registration India, Ministry of Home
> Affairs, Unique Identification Authority of India, NITI Aayog, Direct
> Benefit Transfer (DBT) Mission, Ministry of Finance and State/Union
> Territories Governments are working in close coordination for completion of
> the above exercise. This was stated by the Minister of State for Home
> Affairs, Shri Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary in a written reply....in the
> Lok Sabha."[6] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftn6> As
> apprehended the convergence of the initiatives of MHA and UIDAI was part of
> the design the very outset.
> It does not appear to be a coincidence that Lyon, France based Ronald K
> Noble, Secretary General, INTERPOL, and world’s largest police organisation
> too has called for global electronic e-ID identity card system. When
> Nilekani was asked about the relationship of UID/Aadhaar with the National
> Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) in an interview by Hard News magazine, his
> reply was ‘No Comments’.  Isn’t global electronic e-ID identity card system
> proposed by INTERPOL, e-Identity project of World Bank Group and
> UID/aadhaar related databases linked? Is ‘No Comments’ a convincing answer?
> Biometric documentation of undocumented citizens in developing countries
> which is underway in some 14 developing countries under ETI is aimed at
> bringing them out of anonymity without any legal mandate. Such
> documentation of sensitive data of citizens facilitates bullying and
> invasiveness by the state and international financial institutions.
> Identifying citizens biometrically is an exercise in empire building by
> ‘commercial czars’ and turning citizens in to serfs. Modern day Jaichands,
> Mir Zafars, Jeewan Lals and Mirza Ilahi Bakshis are collaborating to help
> empire builders to earn myopic rewards through attempts to compromise
> citizens’ sovereignty for good.
> The journey of biometric identification and numbering of Indians commenced
> a year after the first war of India’s independence was brutally suppressed
> by the army of British East India Company with the help of collaborators
> who like fifth columnists. The first systematic capture of hand images for
> identification purposes initiated by William Herschel, a civil servant in
> colonial India in 1858. It is noteworthy that in 1898, Edward Henry,
> Inspector General of the Bengal Police established the first British
> fingerprint files in London.
> Referring to the British victory over Indians in 1857, William Howard
> Russell of London Times wrote: “Our siege of Delhi would have been
> impossible, if the Rajas of Patiala and Jhind (Jind) had not been our
> friends”. The seize of the database of personal sensitive biometric
> information of all the Indians would have been impossible but for the help
> of ‘commercial czars’ and the complicity of civil servants and ministers.
> Occupy Wall Street Movement has a pithy slogan ‘Empire is on the Wall
> Street’. The exercise of biometric identification of citizens is a
> comprehensive intelligence initiative with financial surveillance at its
> core. The personal sensitive information like biometric data that is
> collected in myriad disguises and through numerous tempting claims about
> its benefits is going to be purchased by banks and other financial
> institutions to be correlated with other data, and used for purposes that
> was neither agreed nor foreseen. This data is bound to be stolen or
> illegitimately released, exposing citizens to risks of profiling, tracking
> and grievous embarrassments as has happened in the case of Greece, Egypt,
> Pakistan and UK.
> So far legislators and citizens have failed to make bring World Bank Group
> and other international financial institutions under legislative oversight.
> A situation is emerging where if the pre-existing databases like electoral
> database, census and other databases which are under preparation is
> converged, these unaccountable and undemocratic financial institutions will
> never come under parliamentary scrutiny. The identification and
> surveillance technology providers are appear to be aiding an empire of a
> kind where every nano activity is under the vigilance of the Big Brother.
> The flawed assumption of Government of India that the benefits of
> biometric systems are sufficient to warrant use of biometric technology for
> financial transactions is misplaced. The citizens who are succumbing to
> such presumption are doing so because they are not informed about potential
> risks. The blatant use of financial rewards akin to bribes to promote
> citizen’s participation in biometric identification programs sets a very
> harmful precedent as it violates the principle of free and informed
> consent. Informed citizens and democratic legislatures can respond to it
> only through non-cooperation, civil disobedience and voting against parties
> which support the banker-biometric technology vendor nexus.
> *For Details*: Gopal Krishna, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL),
> Mb: 09818089660, 08227816731, E-mail-1715krishna at gmail.com
> ------------------------------
> <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref1>
> [1]
> http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Easier-loans-pensions-and-PPF-with-Aadhaar-power/articleshow/51656486.cms
> [2] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref2>
> http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09STATE129198.html
> [3] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref3>
> https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-place-to-hide-by-glenn-greenwald-on-the-nsas-sweeping-efforts-to-know-it-all/2014/05/12/dfa45dee-d628-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html
> [4] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref4>
> http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/criminals-will-be-able-to-crack-uid-system-easily-jacob-appelbaum-113053100728_1.html
> [5] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref5> Union Budget
> Speech 2009-10
> [6] <#m_2487185324204020050_m_3141718824031835747__ftnref6>
> http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=123480
> *+*
> Begin forwarded message:
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Sukla Sen sukla.sen at gmail.com [IHRO] <IHRO at yahoogroups.com>
> Date: 15 March 2016 at 05:35
> Subject: [IHRO] The Aadhaar coup: Jean Drèze
> To: IHRO at yahoogroups.com
> [The Aadhaar Bill opens the door to mass surveillance. This danger
> needs to be seen in the light of recent attacks on the right to
> dissent. No other country, and certainly no democratic country, has
> ever held its own citizens hostage to such a powerful infrastructure
> of surveillance.]
> http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/jean-dreze-on-aadhaar-mass-surveillance-data-collection/article8352912.ece
> *The Aadhaar coup*
> Updated: March 15, 2016 03:24 IST
> - Jean Drèze
> Jean Dreze Photo: Brijesh Jaiswal
> ***The Aadhaar Bill opens the door to mass surveillance. This danger needs
> to
> be seen in the light of recent attacks on the right to dissent. No other
> country, and certainly no democratic country, has ever held its own
> citizens hostage to such a powerful infrastructure of surveillance.***
> [Emphasis added.]
> The Aadhaar project was sold to the public based on the claim that
> enrolment was “voluntary”
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-purely-voluntary-says-supreme-court-but-extends-its-use-to-more-schemes/article7765893.ece
> >.
> This basically meant that there was no legal compulsion to enrol. The
> government and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI),
> however, worked overtime to create a practical compulsion to enrol: Aadhaar
> was made mandatory for an ever-widening range of facilities and services
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/voluntarily-mandatory/article5182756.ece
> >.
> It became clear that life without Aadhaar would soon be very difficult. In
> these circumstances, saying that Aadhaar is voluntary is like saying that
> breathing or eating is voluntary. Legal or practical, compulsion is
> compulsion.
> *Sweeping powers*
> It took the Supreme Court to put an end to this doublespeak. In March 2014,
> the court ruled that “no person shall be deprived of any service for want
> of Aadhaar number in case he/she is otherwise eligible/entitled”. This was
> a very sensible interpretation of what it would really mean for Aadhaar to
> be voluntary. Throughout the proceedings, incidentally, the Central
> government stood by the claim that Aadhaar was a voluntary facility. The
> Supreme Court did nothing more than to clarify the implications of that
> claim.
> It is important to note that Aadhaar could work wonders as a voluntary
> facility. A certified, verifiable, all-purpose identity card would be a
> valuable document for many people. But the UIDAI has never shown much
> interest in the Aadhaar card, or in developing voluntary applications of
> Aadhaar. Instead, it has relentlessly pushed for Aadhaar being used as a
> mandatory identification number in multiple contexts, and for biometric
> authentication with a centralised database over the Internet. That is a
> very different ball game.
> The Supreme Court order caused consternation in official circles, since it
> ruled out most of the planned applications of Aadhaar. The Aadhaar Bill,
> tabled last week as a money bill in the Lok Sabha and passed by it
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lok-sabha-passes-aadhaar-bill/article8341908.ece
> >,
> is the Central government’s counter-attack. Under Section 7, the Bill gives
> the government sweeping powers to make Aadhaar mandatory for a wide range
> of facilities and services. Further, Section 57 enables the government to
> impose Aadhaar identification in virtually any other context, subject to
> the same safeguards as those applying to Section 7.
> In concrete terms, the Bill allows the government to make Aadhaar
> authentication compulsory
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/10-instances-when-the-govt-said-you-needed-an-adhaar/article7526264.ece
> >
> for salary payments, old-age pensions, school enrolment, train bookings,
> marriage certificates, getting a driving licence, buying a SIM card, using
> a cybercafé — virtually anything. Judging from the experience of the last
> few years, the government will exercise these powers with abandon and
> extend Aadhaar’s grip to ever more imaginative domains. Indeed, Aadhaar was
> always intended to be “ubiquitous”, as Nandan Nilekani, former Chairman of
> the UIDAI, himself puts it.
> Also read: 10 instances when the government said you needed an adhaar
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/10-instances-when-the-govt-said-you-needed-an-adhaar/article7526264.ece
> >
> *Mass surveillance*
> Why is this problematic? Various concerns have been raised, from the
> unreliability of biometrics to possible breaches of confidentiality. But
> the main danger is that Aadhaar opens the door to mass surveillance
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/the-aadhaar-bill-dont-compromise-on-privacy/article8328008.ece
> >.
> Most of the “Aadhaar-enabled” databases will be accessible to the
> government even without invoking the special powers available under the
> Bill, such as the blanket “national security” clause. It will be child’s
> play for intelligence agencies to track anyone and everyone — where we
> live, when we move, which events we attend, whom we marry or meet or talk
> to on the phone. No other country, and certainly no democratic country, has
> ever held its own citizens hostage to such a powerful infrastructure of
> surveillance.
> If this sounds like paranoia, think again. Total surveillance is the dream
> of intelligence agencies, as we know from Edward Snowden and other
> insiders. The Indian government’s own inclination to watch and control
> dissenters of all hues has been amply demonstrated in recent years. For
> every person who is targeted or harassed, one thousand fall into line. The
> right to privacy is an essential foundation of the freedom to dissent.
> Mass surveillance threatens to halt the historic expansion of civil
> liberties and personal freedom. For centuries, ordinary people have lived
> under the tyranny of oppressive governments. Compulsion, arrests,
> executions, torture were the accepted means of ensuring their submission to
> authority. It took long and harsh struggles to win the freedoms that we
> enjoy and take for granted today — the freedom to move about as we wish,
> associate with whoever we like, speak up without fear. No doubt these
> freedoms are still elusive for large sections of the populations,
> especially Dalits and those who live under the boot of the security forces.
> But that is a case for expansion, not restriction, of the freedoms we
> already have.
> The Aadhaar Bill asks us to forget these historic struggles and repose our
> faith in the benevolence of the government. Of course, there is no
> immediate danger of democracy being subverted or civil liberties being
> suspended. Only an innocent, however, would fail to anticipate Aadhaar
> being used as a tool of mass surveillance. And mass surveillance per se is
> an infringement of democracy and civil liberties, even if the government
> does not act on it. As Glenn Greenwald aptly puts it in his book *No Place
> to Hide*, “history shows that the mere existence of a mass surveillance
> apparatus, regardless of how it is used, is in itself sufficient to stifle
> dissent.”
> *Uncertain benefits*
> The champions of the Aadhaar Bill downplay these concerns for the sake of
> enabling the government to save some money. Wild claims are being made
> about Aadhaar’s power to plug leakages. In reality, Aadhaar can only help
> to plug specific types of leakages, such as those related to duplication in
> beneficiary lists. It will be virtually useless to plug leakages in, say,
> the Public Distribution System (PDS), which have little to do with identity
> fraud. On the other hand, recent experience has shown that Aadhaar could
> easily play havoc with the PDS. Wherever Aadhaar authentication has been
> imposed on the PDS, there have been complaints of delays, authentication
> failures, connectivity problems, and more. The poorer States, where the PDS
> is most needed, are least prepared for this sort of technology. There are
> better ways of reforming the PDS. Similar remarks apply to the Mahatma
> Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS).
> I have seen some of this damage at close range in Jharkhand, where Aadhaar
> was supposed to prove its mettle. Aadhaar applications (in the PDS,
> MGNREGS, and even the banking system) have had poor results in Jharkhand,
> and caused much disruption. For instance, MGNREGS functionaries have
> cancelled job cards on a large scale for the sake of achieving “100 per
> cent Aadhaar seeding” of the job-cards database. MGNREGS workers have been
> offloaded by rural banks on Aadhaar-enabled “business correspondents” who
> proved unable to pay them due to poor connectivity. And the proposed
> imposition of biometric authentication at ration shops threatens to disrupt
> recent progress with PDS reforms in Jharkhand.
> Seven years after it was formed, the UIDAI has failed to produce
> significant evidence of Aadhaar having benefits that would justify the
> risks. Instead, it has shown a disturbing tendency to rely on public
> relations, sponsored studies and creative estimates (including the
> much-cited figure of Rs.12,700 crore for annual savings on the LPG
> subsidy). To my knowledge, there has been no serious evaluation of any of
> the Aadhaar applications so far. Worse, some failed experiments have been
> projected as successes through sheer propaganda — business correspondents
> in Ratu (Jharkhand) and “direct benefit transfer” of kerosene subsidies in
> Kotkasim (Rajasthan) are just two examples.
> No doubt Aadhaar, if justified, could have some useful applications. Given
> the risks, however, the core principle should be “minimum use, maximum
> safeguards”. The government has shown its preference for the opposite —
> maximum use, minimum safeguards. The Aadhaar Bill includes some helpful
> safeguards, but it does nothing to restrain the use of Aadhaar or prevent
> its misuse as a tool of mass surveillance. And even the safeguards protect
> the UIDAI more than the public.
> The wizards of Aadhaar are fond of telling us that we are on the threshold
> of a “revolution”. With due respect for their zeal, a coup would be a more
> appropriate term. The Aadhaar Bill enables the government to evade the
> Supreme Court orders and build an infrastructure of social control.
> Further, it does so by masquerading as a money bill, pre-empting any
> serious discussion of these issues. This undemocratic process reinforces
> the case for worrying about Aadhaar.
> *(Jean Drèze is Visiting Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranchi
> University.)*
> <
> http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/jean-dreze-on-aadhaar-mass-surveillance-data-collection/article8352912.ece#comments
> >
> ______________________________
> Jai Sen
> jai.sen at cacim.net
> www.cacim.net / http://www.openword.net.in
> Now based in New Delhi, India (+91-98189 11325) and in Ottawa, Canada
> (+1-613-282 2900)
> *Recent Publications :*
> Jai Sen, ed, 2013 – *The Movements of Movements : Struggles for Other
> Worlds*, Part I*.* Volume 4 Part I in the *Challenging Empires* series.
> New Delhi : OpenWord.  *Prefinal version 1.0 available
> @ http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/the_movements_of_movements/
> <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/the_movements_of_movements/>*
> Jai Sen, ed, 2016 – *The Movements of Movements, Part 1 : What Makes Us
> Move ?*.  Volume 4 in the *Challenging Empires* series (New Delhi :
> OpenWord and Oakland, CA : PM Press)
> *&*
> Jai Sen, ed, 2017 – *The Movements of Movements, Part 2 : Rethinking Our
> Dance*.  Volume 5 in the *Challenging Empires* series (New Delhi :
> OpenWord and Oakland, CA : PM Press)
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